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The exercise of the voting right in a joint-stock company
Slavíková, Lucie ; Zahradníčková, Marie (referee)
The Exercise of the Voting Right in a Join-Stock Company Abstract The submitted thesis analyses the voting right of a shareholder and the exercise of the voting right in a joint-stock company. In the last few years, a tendency to encourage the engagement of shareholders and to broaden the scope of decision rights of shareholders can be seen. Nevertheless, some authors underestimate the importance of the shareholders' right to vote and conclude that real decision-making power lies with the management or administrative board. The main hypothesis to be proven or rebutted is that the shareholder's voting right is not insignificant and vesting decision-making power in shareholders can have a positive influence on the effectiveness of the management of the company notwithstanding the broad liberty of the shareholder to both freely exercise and dispose of the voting right (the shares) and notwithstanding the existence of deviations from the principle of proportionality. The thesis aims to examine the voting right in its complexity, in contrast to the prevailing approach of contemporary Czech jurisprudence, and to contribute to academic knowledge with original arguments and conclusions. This goal is achieved by extensive use of foreign legal sources, mainly French and Belgian literature and case law, since the...
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The Exercise of the Voting Right in a Join-Stock Company
Slavíková, Lucie ; Černá, Stanislava (advisor) ; Dvořák, Tomáš (referee) ; Josková, Lucie (referee)
The Exercise of the Voting Right in a Join-Stock Company Abstract The submitted thesis analyses the voting right of a shareholder and the exercise of the voting right in a joint-stock company. In the last few years, a tendency to encourage the engagement of shareholders and to broaden the scope of decision rights of shareholders can be seen. Nevertheless, some authors underestimate the importance of the shareholders' right to vote and conclude that real decision-making power lies with the management or administrative board. The main hypothesis to be proven or rebutted is that the shareholder's voting right is not insignificant and vesting decision-making power in shareholders can have a positive influence on the effectiveness of the management of the company notwithstanding the broad liberty of the shareholder to both freely exercise and dispose of the voting right (the shares) and notwithstanding the existence of deviations from the principle of proportionality. The thesis aims to examine the voting right in its complexity, in contrast to the prevailing approach of contemporary Czech jurisprudence, and to contribute to academic knowledge with original arguments and conclusions. This goal is achieved by extensive use of foreign legal sources, mainly French and Belgian literature and case law, since the...
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Sequential vote buying
Chen, Y. ; Zápal, Jan
To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy passes or paid up front. With transfer promises, a vote costs nearly zero. With up-front payments, a vote can cost significantly more than zero, but the leader is better off with up-front payments. The leader does not necessarily buy the votes of those least opposed. The opposition structure most challenging to the leader involves either a homogeneous committee or a committee with two homogenous groups. Our results provide an explanation for several empirical regularities: lobbying of strongly opposed legislators, the Tullock Paradox and expansion of the whip system in the U.S. House concurrent with ideological homogenization of parties. We also discuss several extensions including private histories and simultaneous offers.
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